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ophy and the Christian Faith (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp.
241-78.
11. He is drawing on a discussion by Max Black in "The Identity of Indiscernibles" in
his Problems of Analysis (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 80-92 (to which
Hughes provides no reference). The fact that Black's example is of a world containing
only two qualitatively alld relatiollally indiscernible spheres seems to make it inappropriate for Hughes's purpose here: "We might suppose that each was made of chemically pure
iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the same temperature, color, and so on, and
that nothing else existed. Then every quality and relational characteristic of the one would
also be a property of the other" (p. 83).
12. Hughes comes close to admitting this when he says "the Father and the Son are
discernible, ill that the Son is generated by the Father and the Father is not" (p. 214;
emphasis added).
13. We are grateful to Christopher Hughes for corresponding with us about some of the
issues in his book.

Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage, by
Lee Yearley. Volume Two in the series, "Toward a Comparative Philosophy
of Religions," Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, editors. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1990. Pp. xiv and 280. 16.95 (paper).

JEAN PORTER, University of Notre Dame
In his introduction, Frank Reynolds describes the aim of the series, "Towards
a Comparative Philosophy of Religions," as "the development of a new kind
of comparative philosophy of religions that is global in its perspective and
in tune with contemporary philosophical developments and issues" (xi). At
least some of the philosophical developments to which Reynolds refers have
made this a daunting task indeed. In particular, the growing consensus
against epistemological foundationalism has raised questions as to whether
it is possible genuinely to understand, much less to assess, intellectual and
moral traditions radically different from the observer's own. Seen in this
light, earlier efforts to spell out a universal core of beliefs and values embedded within the world's great religions are likely to appear as drastic oversimplifications at best, distorting projections of the observer's own convictions
at the worst.
And yet, it is hard to know what alternative we have. We could follow the
example of those anthropologists who offer detailed "thick" descriptions of
the traditions of other societies, without attempting to identify any common
ground between them and us. But while this approach avoids the pitfalls of
a false universalism, it does not offer much in the way of a basis for dialogue
among those who have been formed in disparate traditions. And given the
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realities of global interdependence, the need for such a dialogue has never
been more apparent.
In his comparative study of the theories of virtue and the notions of courage
contained in the works of Aquinas (d.1274) and the Chinese Confucian philosopher Mencius (4th century B.C.E.), Lee Yearley sets two goals for himself. He offers an illuminating analysis and comparison of two central
thinkers from two very different traditions, and in addition, he also develops
a methodology for comparative religious ethics that allows for real comparisons and assessments, while still acknowledging the incommensurability of
at least some of the main religious traditions. And of course, these two aims
are not unconnected. Yearley has not only taken two premodern thinkers as
the objects of his research, he has also taken much of his methodology from
one of them. Specifically, his comparative work draws on Aquinas' theory of
the virtues and his use of analogical analysis to provide a model for bringing
together seemingly disparate concepts under one overall scheme.
As Yearley acknowledges, Aquinas' moral theory may seem to be "a very
odd place" to look for a model for comparative religious ethics (181). But
further reflection indicates that Yearley's move is not as odd as it may at first
appear to be. Aquinas' own task as a moral theorist required him to bring
together diverse and sometimes incommensurable traditions and thinkers,
including Aristotle and his Islamic and Jewish interpreters, Augustine and his
many interpreters, and a wide range of other classical and Christian sources.
And as YearJey argues, Aquinas' analysis of virtues in terms of their parts,
and his use of analogical analysis of key concepts, enabled him to bring
together in creative and unexpected ways the diverse conceptions of human
flourishing that he found in his sources. He was of course attempting to
develop a unified theoretical synthesis, whereas the modern comparativist
seeks understanding without necessarily moving towards a synthesis. But
Yearley argues, brilliantly and convincingly, that Aquinas' method can nonetheless suggest a way of approaching the comparative study of religious ethics
today.
He summarizes Aquinas' theory of virtue as follows: "Aquinas argues that
a virtue can have three parts. First are the qualities, the component parts,
that help shape a single virtue's action: for example, memory and foresight
in prudence. Second are those distinct virtues, allied virtues, that share the
essential characteristic of the primary virtue but fail to express it fUlly, even
if they may express other qualities of the primary virtue more fully than it
does ... Third are those separable and substantially different activities of a
virtue, the types of a virtue, that appear when the virtue operates in distinct
spheres of life; for example, military and political prudence ... The idea that
virtues have parts, as well as most other aspects of Aquinas's attempts to
harmonize different thinkers' ideas on virtues, rests on one major foundation:
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the theoretical procedures or performances involved in the analysis of analogical predication" (184-185). By means of this apparatus, Aquinas is able
to bring together accounts of virtue that seem at first glance to have little in
common, or even to be in opposition. For example, he brings together
Augustine's account of patience with Aristotle's very different account of courage by taking Augustinian patience to be a component or allied part of Aristotelian courage, and he then further extends Aristotle's conception of courage to
include both martyrdom and endurance through an analogical extension of
the concepts of death and warfare that are central to that conception.
Yearley appropriates Aquinas' methods in a context provided by the philosopher Robin Horton. According to Horton, in attempting to understand any
extended tradition, we must distinguish between primary theories, which
systematize the observations and data that accumulate in any society, and
secondary theories, which attempt to explain the world of natural observations in terms of unseen or abstract realities, for example, ideal forms or
benevolent spirits. To this division of kinds of theories Yearley adds a third,
namely, the practical theory, which for him includes any effort to derive
norms for action from one's primary and secondary theories.
At the level of primary theories Mencius and Aquinas unsurprisingly have
a great deal in common; for example, their most basic accounts of the place
of sexual desire and fear in human life are very similar. At the level of
secondary theories they are again similar in some respects; for example, they
would agree that there is a given human nature, defined in part in terms of
unrealized capacities which depend for their actualization on the action of a
power that transcends the human. But resemblances at this level are thin; that
is to say, they are so abstract, or else have to do with such a narrowly
circumscribed area of life, that they tell us very little about either Mencius
or Aquinas, or about the practical concerns central to. each. Thus, when we
ask just how Mencius and Aquinas understand the relation between human
and transhuman forces in the development of human character, it becomes
clear that each thinker spells out that relationship in terms of conceptions, of
numinous psychophysical energy (ch'i) or of divine grace (gratia), that only
make sense within the wider intellectual framework that each one develops.
If the fully textured secondary theories of each are not taken into account,
therefore, the thin similarities at this level may conceal the profound differences between the Chinese philosopher and the Italian theologian.
But when we turn to the practical theories of Mencius and Aquinas, a more
interesting pattern of differences and similarities emerges. At this level, each
thinker works out an account of human flourishing, and the kinds of virtues
productive of human flourishing, that goes well beyond the crude folk psychology of his received primary theories of human action and motivation,
and yet is developed in relative independence of his secondary theory. (This
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is of course a controversial claim, at least as applied to Aquinas, but 1 believe
YearJey is correct.) Hence, if we are to identify significant similarities between the theories of Mencius and Aquinas, we will be most likely to be
successful when comparing their practical theories of human flourishing and
its corresponding virtues. And Yearley argues that this is indeed the case.
Although they are clearly dissimilar in many ways, Mencius' and Aquinas'
accounts of the virtues, analyzed along the lines suggested by Aquinas' analogical theory of virtue, reveal unexpected and illuminating similarities. For
example, while the notion of dispositions is more congenial to Aquinas'
theory than to Mencius', it nonetheless serves to illuminate a range of notions
in the latter; in turn, Mencius' reflections on automatic reactions can help to
clarify Aquinas' accounts of intelligent dispositions, habits, tendencies, and
invariant reactions. This means of analysis therefore serves to clarify the
thought of two very different moral theorists, to bring to light unexpected
similarities between them, and to aid us in our own efforts to think through
the issues that they raise.
It is unfortunate that a book of this sort, which crosses so many disciplinary
lines, will probably be neglected by many "pure" scholars in the fields of
moral philosophy, religious ethics, and the history of moral thought. YearJey
has written what is one of the most significant books in recent years in all of
these areas. His approach will of course be controversial, not least because
he contends that the moral thought of at least some religious thinkers can be
understood apart from their religious theories, to some degree at least. But
the questions that his book raises are a mark of the cogency and importance
of his arguments. His treatments of Mencius and Aquinas are always illuminating, and while 1 did not agree with his interpretations of Aquinas at every
point, his treatment of Aquinas' theory of the virtues is by far the best that I have
ever seen. (I am not competent to evaluate his interpretation of Mencius.) Even
more importantly, he has managed to offer a method for the comparative study
of religious ethics that is at least prima facie plausible, and whether it is
finally judged to be successful or not, that in itself is a rare and important
achievement. No serious scholar of moral thought in any of its forms can
afford to neglect this seminal book.
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